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ARTICLE

JUSTIFYING BAD DEALS

TESS WILKINSON-RYAN†
In the past decade, psychological and behavioral studies have found that
individual commitment to contracts persists beyond personal relationships and
traditional promises. Even take-it-or-leave it consumer contracts get substantial
deference from consumers—even when the terms are unenforceable, even when the
assent is procedurally compromised, and even when the drafter is an impersonal
commercial actor. Indeed, there is mounting evidence that people import the morality
of promise into situations that might otherwise be described as predatory, exploitative,
or coercive. The purpose of this Article is to propose a framework for understanding
what seems to be widespread acceptance of regulation via unread terms. I refer to this
phenomenon as “term deference”—the finding that people defer to the term, even
when the assent is perfunctory, and even when the term is unfair.
The framework I propose is a motivated reasoning explanation: when it feels
better to believe that contracts are fair and that assent is reliable, people are more
likely to hold those beliefs. In order to predict when contractual fairness will be
especially psychologically urgent, I draw on an extensive body of psychological
literature on the preference for believing in a just world, or for being satisfied with
the status quo. When a phenomenon or a system appears implacable and unavoidable,
it is psychologically less stressful to believe that the system is good. “System
justification” is a well-documented psychological phenomenon that predicts when
individuals will be motivated to hold beliefs that support the status quo, even when
the status quo redounds to their own disadvantage. The two studies reported here
manipulate the pressure to support the status quo—to believe that firms are reasonable
and contract law is fair—by varying the term’s enforceability, its consequences, and
† Professor of Law & Psychology, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. I am grateful
to Jeﬀrey Rachlinski and participants in the George Mason University Law and Economics
Experimental Research Workshop for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Many thanks to
Michelle Wang (Penn Law ‘21) for her excellent research assistance.
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its history. The findings show the predicted patterns, that increased psychological
pressure to support the status quo increases beliefs that the status quo is good and fair.
These results also align with the prediction that pressure to justify the status quo is
not only a psychological state, but also a trait. That trait, highly associated with
political conservatism, is reflected in the results suggesting a stronger motivation to
justify the status quo among subjects who report that they are more politically
conservative. The results here have implications not only for contract and consumer
law, but also for how we understand self-interest in legal decisionmaking, and for the
legal understandings of consent and compliance.
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INTRODUCTION
The psychology of contract law is a young ﬁeld, but it has recently
amassed an impressive cluster of null results that might be described as
“consumers not complaining about bad deals.” It is a longstanding challenge
for researchers to systematically describe a fact in the world that mostly
manifests as a puzzling absence (for Sherlock Holmes fans, a dog that does
not bark), because it can be hard to pin down what is so compelling about
something that does not happen. But in the last ten years, scholars have
oﬀered detailed accounts of consumer inaction—inaction that costs them real
money—across the universe of consumer contracts. A number of high-stakes
examples come to mind. In 2009, in a crashing housing market, economists
were perplexed to ﬁnd that underwater homeowners, who could have saved
hundreds of thousands of dollars by choosing foreclosure and walking away,
kept paying down their inﬂated mortgages even as the lenders were bailed
out.1 In the decade since California has banned noncompete clauses,
employees with patently unenforceable noncompetes in their employment
contracts have nonetheless adhered to their terms and refused better job
oﬀers.2 And by their own account, thousands of everyday participants in

1 See, e.g., John Krainer & Stephen LeRoy, Underwater Mortgages, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
SAN FRANCISCO ECONOMIC LETTER 3-4 (2010), https://www.frbsf.org/economicresearch/publications/economic-letter/2010/october/underwater-mortgages [https://perma.cc/W6FSUKC4] (finding that most borrowers continued to pay down underwater loans during the housing
crisis and showing that default rates actually declined for borrowers whose loans were the most
“irretrievably underwater”).
2 Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman Bishara, The Behavioral Eﬀects of (Unenforceable) Contracts,
J.L.
ECON.
&
ORG.
(forthcoming
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2858637 [https://perma.cc/V7S4-5UFN] (showing that noncompete agreements
are associated with reduced employee mobility even in states that do not enforce such contracts).
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routine contracting treat the terms of their unread take-it-or-leave-it
boilerplate with the same deference as negotiated deals.3
These findings could be dismissed as anomalies, but they could also be taken
seriously, as prima facie evidence of a behavioral phenomenon. This Article aims
to describe consumers’ deference to burdensome terms as a phenomenon in its
own right, and then to test the role of motivated cognition—i.e., wishful
thinking—in the emerging moral psychology of consumer contracts.
The motivated reasoning hypothesis grows from the informal observation
that most people would prefer to be agents than pawns. It is also, however, a
natural next step in the empirical literature. The last decade of research in
the psychology of consumer contracting has identiﬁed two important
patterns. The ﬁrst is that people take promises seriously.4 This ﬁnding is easy
for psychologists to explain in the sense that it is an explicit value; many
people can and do articulate that promise-keeping is a moral norm that they
have internalized and hold dear.5 The second pattern is that people import
the conventional morality of interpersonal promise-keeping into situations
that might otherwise be described as predatory, exploitative, or coercive.6
People treat predatory contracts like promises to their friends. That ﬁnding
is less easy to explain, and the purpose of this Article is to propose a
framework for understanding what seems to be widespread acceptance of
regulation via unread terms. I describe this deference to terms as puzzling
because it seems at odds with most people’s material self-interest. The
literature suggests that people defer to the terms as written, even when the
assent is perfunctory, and even when a term is unfair. We ought to be
surprised that people who are otherwise comparison shopping and
discriminating on price are leaving value on the table.
To be intentionally tendentious: in the United States, ﬁrms unilaterally
draft private legislation, without oversight, and use American contract law to
enforce their rules.7 Everyone does8 and everyone must agree to take-it-or-

3 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing Standard Terms, 103 CORNELL
L. REV. 117, 124-26 (2017) (reporting experimental studies of consumer responses to hidden terms).
4 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Legal Promise and Psychological Contract, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 843,
845-46 (2012) (reviewing the psychological correlates of promissory morality and contract morality).
5 Id. at 846-51.
6 See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan supra note 3 at 164 (“When terms are memorialized and documents
shared, they assume the mantle of contract-capital-C, with all of its moral and social baggage.”)
7 See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013) (presenting a sweeping overview of the role of ﬁne print
in American economic life and articulating its implications for legal legitimacy).
8 Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet: Ignoring the Privacy
Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services, 23 INFO. COMMC’N & SOC’Y 127,
140 (2018) (showing that the vast majority of individuals ignore clickwrap agreements or agree to
them without spending any meaningful time reading).
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leave it deals in order to participate in American economic and social life.9
Taking no particular view about whether or not companies make good rules,
and acknowledging that ﬁrms may not consistently choose the worst terms
they can get away with,10 it is still true that terms are not closely regulated by
the market or the government, and are not “chosen” in any interesting sense
of that word by the individuals subject to their constraints.11 So why is the
assent analysis so sticky? Why do courts and consumers still talk about what
consumers have agreed to?12
The core hypothesis for this Article is that term deference is a motivated
reasoning phenomenon. What this means is that when it feels better to believe
that contracts are fair and that assent is reliable, people are at least marginally
more likely to hold those beliefs. This itself is not controversial; self-serving
biases are well-documented in the law and psychology literature.13 What is
novel, and counterintuitive, is the proposition that it might feel good for
consumers themselves to believe that consumers should defer to their
corporate counterparties. “Myside bias,”14 as it is sometimes called, usually
favors the material beneﬁt of the one making the judgment.15 So why would
consumers themselves support hidden fees or ﬁne-print arbitration clauses?
The prediction is twofold. First, it is psychologically appealing to believe that
overall the system functions.16 Consumers have very little actual control, and
so it is appealing to believe in the social order. This is the just world

9 See generally Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Searching for the
Common Law: The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 7 (2017).
10 See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts:
The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 448-49 (2008) (reporting
equivocal ﬁndings on the eﬀects of competition on burdensome terms).
11 Cf. Eric A. Posner, ProCD v. Zeidenberg and Cognitive Overload in Contractual Bargaining, 77
U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1190 (2010) (arguing that sellers cannot realistically oﬀer buyers options of
diﬀerent sets of terms and conditions); id. at 1191 (hypothesizing that buyers “choose” contract terms
only in the sense that they choose sellers with a reputation for fair terms); id. at 1185-89 (describing
how consumers may choose terms only by researching them prior to purchase or by reading them
before deciding whether to return a product).
12 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 744 (2002)
(describing the ﬁctional relationship between a consumer’s “intent” and the granular legal analysis
of when precisely the terms are available for review by the consumer).
13 See, e.g., George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, Colin Camerer & Linda Babcock, Self-Serving
Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 135-59 (1993) (showing the effects
of motivated reasoning on good faith efforts to reason neutrally about fairness in a zero-sum task).
14 See, e.g., Jonathan Baron, Myside Bias in Thinking About Abortion, 1 THINKING & REASONING
221 (1995) (explaining myside bias as a “failure to think of arguments on the other side”).
15 Keith E. Stanovich, Richard F. West & Maggie E. Toplak, Myside Bias, Rational Thinking,
and Intelligence, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 259, 259-264 (2013).
16 Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, Just World Research and the Attribution Process: Looking
Back and Ahead, 85 PSYCH. BULLETIN, 1030, 1030-51 (1978) (describing the ﬁrst generation of just
world bias research in psychology).
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hypothesis,17 or system justiﬁcation theory.18 The second is that there is
something particular about believing that assent—or perhaps more correctly,
consent—is meaningful. It is important to believe that when humans agree,
that agreement is real.
I. THE TROPE OF THE FECKLESS CONSUMER: AN ILLUSTRATION
A core fact of consumer contracting is that individuals are sometimes
subject to bad terms.19 One way to interpret this fact is that ﬁrms prey on
unsuspecting consumers, who are powerless to help themselves.20 Another
interpretation is that consumers have power that they are too lazy or shortsighted to exercise21—they are feckless, not powerless.
A familiar window into the rhetoric of all’s-fair-in-love-and-contracts is the
fable of the feckless consumer who did not read the fine print.22 If there is one
thing that almost everyone (except contracts scholars) can agree on, it is that
reading contracts is good. Even in academic literature, researchers have been
preoccupied with increasing readership since pre-internet days.23 Readership, or
failure to read, is also a perennial feature of popular contracts commentary.24
Articles exposing or criticizing bad contract terms are often framed in terms of
the foolish consumer who finds himself victim to the savvy firm. Take, for
example, a recent op-ed in The Washington Post on the pitfalls of travel contracts:
It’s no exaggeration to say that many, if not most, travel problems start with
a failure to read the terms and conditions. . . . [For example, c]ruise contracts
say the staﬀ may search your cabin for any reason at any time. The cruise line
can also use your image for any purpose without compensation. . . . Travel

Id.
See Ido Liviatan & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory: Motivated Social Cognition in the
Service of the Status Quo, 29 SOC. COGNITION 231, 231 (2011) (discussing the development and
signiﬁcance of system justiﬁcation theory).
19 See, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L.
REV. 359, 359, 365-67 (1969) (articulating the purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code’s
unconscionability doctrine and other consumer protection legislation).
20 See, e.g., Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 201-02 (2005)
(explaining that courts tend to cite inequality of bargaining power when finding a contract unconscionable).
21 See generally Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA.
L. REV. 117, 120 (2007) (reviewing a variety of consumer mistakes and their effects on form contracting).
22 See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 917, 945 (1974) (“The nineteenth century departure from the equitable conception of contract
is particularly obvious in the rapid adoption of the doctrine of caveat emptor.”) (emphasis added).
23 See, e.g., Griﬃth L. Garwood, Robert J. Hobbs & Fred H. Miller, Consumer Disclosure in the
1990s, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 777, 782-83 (1993) (arguing for increased readability in contracts).
24 See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 3, at 128-29 (describing the internally conﬂicting norms
that dominate popular accounts of contract).
17
18

2020]

Justifying Bad Deals

199

insurance policies are written in gibberish. Even if you think you understand
what you’ve read, you might want to read it again.25

Cruise ship employees with carte blanche search power is probably a term
people both strongly dislike and fail to anticipate. In light of that, the rhetoric
is telling. In the face of a stark consumer choice—accept unlimited search or
do not go on your cruise—the op-ed locates prime responsibility not with the
ﬁrm that insisted on intrusive privacy terms, but with the consumer who did
not read them. Indeed, the suggested remedy for what we might view as ﬁne
print overreach by the ﬁrms is to read the ﬁne print more than once. Such a
commitment to consumer prudence is not supported by either the evidence
or by the underlying logic, which suggests that the scolding tone is motivated
by something other than accuracy. The belief that consumers ought to help
themselves appears to be more deontological than consequentialist.
That example is admittedly cherry-picked, but it is not isolated. Those
who follow contracts in the national media may recall the 2015 multi-part
investigative series in the New York Times.26 The series, a serious look at the
ubiquity and equities of arbitration, nonetheless went by the subtitle,
“Beware the Fine Print.”27 I drew ﬁve examples from the past two years of
national news media of terms that were, by the lights of the articles
themselves, egregious. The purpose is largely suggestive, to bring some
speciﬁcity to a cultural narrative that most of us will ﬁnd very familiar.
A Nonrandom Sample of Popular Rhetoric Around Bad Terms:
•
•

Class action waivers in consumer contracts: “The next time you
open a bank account or sign up for a credit card, make sure you
read the ﬁne print.”28
Mandatory arbitration for workplace sexual harassment claims: “[I]t’s
easy to overlook practical tasks such as closely reading your
employment contract. But that document may contain terms and

25 Christopher Elliott, Read the Fine Print Before You Travel, WASH. POST (July 3, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/travel/read-the-ﬁne-print-before-youtravel/2019/07/03/102a0342-977b-11e9-8d0a-5edd7e2025b1_story.html?noredirect=on
[https://perma.cc/8VPD-ZDZ3].
26 Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/
arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/G8ZV-6YES] (reporting
on the effects of mandatory arbitration across a variety of contracts domains).
27 Id.
28 CNN, Ways You Sign Your Rights Away with Bank Accounts, WCPO, (Oct. 26, 2017, 1:09 PM),
https://www.wcpo.com/money/consumer/dont-waste-your-money/4-ways-can-sign-away-rightssign-bank-account-credit-card [https://perma.cc/9AMW-BK7Y].
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conditions you should know about in advance, not discover later
after you’ve signed away your rights.”29
Disclaimer of liability for a moving company that auctioned oﬀ a
family’s possessions instead of moving them from one residence to the
other: “[I]t is important to read every word of a contract before
signing or accepting it . . . .”30
Unenforceable noncompete agreement: “Free tip from a lawyer:
always read the ﬁne print. You’re welcome.”31
Discontinued coverage for smoke damage in homeowners policies in a
wildfire zone: “Although all changes must be disclosed, many
homeowners may not pay attention or may not read the fine print.
‘People have to be very vigilant[.]’”32

These ﬁve terms are each serious enough and onerous enough to be
subject to plausible legal challenge.33 Indeed, some of the terms reported were
plainly impermissible at the time of the reporting; the purpose of covering
noncompete clauses was explicitly to point out that the terms are not legally
enforceable but nonetheless included in the contracts.34 In each case, the
article, or even the title, frames the problem as consumer failure to read
carefully. In each case we should retort, “how would that help?!”
The family whose possessions were sold oﬀ at auction by their moving
company almost certainly would not have predicted that outcome from a
bland waiver of liability. And how would reading a noncompete clause, which
is not enforceable by the ﬁrm, be helpful to a new employee? Presumably that
employee would be better oﬀ reading the Civil Code of California.35 The
29 Rebecca Koenig, What You Need to Know About Mandatory Arbitration, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT (July 9, 2018, 12:36 PM), https://money.usnews.com/careers/company-culture/articles/
2018-07-09/what-you-need-to-know-about-mandatory-arbitration [https://perma.cc/2LYU-SKPV].
30 Diane Walker, What to Look Out for When Signing a Contract, NBC 12 (May 14, 2019, 9:52 PM),
https://www.nbc12.com/2019/05/15/what-look-out-when-signing-contract/ [https://perma.cc/UN43-2GW2].
31 Mark Gabel, When Companies Make Workers Sign Illegal Non-Compete Agreements, MEDIUM
(May 21, 2017), https://medium.com/@gabel_law_ﬁrm/when-companies-make-workers-sign-illegalnon-compete-agreements-4f158174d8e [https://perma.cc/C9J9-YGYV].
32 David Lazarus, How to Deal With an Insurer After Your Home Is Burned Down, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 12, 2018, 1:35 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la-ﬁ-lazarus-california-ﬁreinsurance-20181112-story.html [https://perma.cc/VNP3-5PV4].
33 See, e.g., Speidel, supra note 19, at 365-67 (reviewing state and federal approaches to term overreach).
34 Gabel supra note 31 (“I suspect that these companies and their lawyers know exactly what
they’re doing, because when we point out to them that their non-compete clause violates California
law, they sometimes refuse to remove them. These companies apparently hope to intimidate the
employee into working for the company for as long as the employer wants, under whatever terms
the employer wants to impose, by causing the employee to fear violating the clause.”).
35 The California Business and Professions Code provides that “[e]xcept as provided in this
chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or
business of any kind is to that extent void.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (Deering 1941).
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individual job-seeker probably does not have the leverage to strike a
mandatory arbitration clause, and likely has professional and ﬁnancial needs
that render such a clause low-priority.36 Perhaps the most useful standard
example is the class action waiver. There is simply no world where individual
consumers make better market decisions by knowing whether a particular
ﬁrm does or does not waive class actions.37 The probability of that term
aﬀecting any particular consumer is minute,38 and indeed all the more trivial
when the term is common across products and ﬁrms.39
Overall, these cases are best understood as potential catalysts for political,
rather than individual, action. As such, the focus on individual responsibility
here is odd, given that consumers have minimal incentives and little power to
improve their own outcomes,40 whereas ﬁrms can swiftly (perhaps) and
unilaterally choose to draft diﬀerent terms.41 Whether or not it is eﬃcient or
right for them to do so is its own question, but in this Article I start from the
proposition that some terms are widely agreed to be burdensome, and then
ask why they are nonetheless acceptable.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I lays out the existing evidence
that the law and psychology, respectively, of consumer contracting is highly
deferential to drafters. Part II introduces the psychological theory of system
justiﬁcation, which posits that beliefs and preferences that justify the existing
social and legal order are motivated—they are psychologically less dissonant
and more appealing. This Part also draws connections between the
predictions of system justiﬁcation theory and existing evidence from the
social science of consumer contracting. Part III tests three hypotheses derived
36 See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of
Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 452-53
(1996) (arguing that employers, as repeat players, have the incentive and ability to attend to
employment contracts more carefully than employees, who are one-shot players).
37 Cf. Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 680
(2004) (“Even a rational buyer who anticipates that a proposed contract does not fully internalize
purchaser interests, for instance, could fail to review terms if the buyer predicted that transactional
breakdowns to which disfavored terms apply are unlikely to occur . . . .”).
38 See generally W. Mark C. Weidemaier, The Arbitration Clause in Context: How Contract Terms Do
(and Do Not) Define the Process, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 655 (2006) (describing the complex barriers
to implementing arbitration clauses). But see id. at 675-76 (suggesting that firms that desire to insulate
themselves from class actions can prioritize that end when structuring arbitration agreements).
39 See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An
Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 871,
876 (2008) (finding that over three-quarters of the studied companies used mandatory arbitration clauses).
40 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 211, 227 (1995) (arguing that parties rationally ignore the consequences of terms, such as
liquidated damages provisions, they expect never to apply).
41 But see Robert Anderson, Path Dependence, Information, and Contracting in Business Law and
Economics, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 553, 556 (arguing that contract drafting is in fact quite costly, and that
the costs are often reﬂected in outdated or poorly constructed terms).
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from that literature: that unfair terms, and the laws that favor them, are more
palatable when they are diﬃcult to challenge, likely to harm consumers, and
longstanding. The evidence from these two studies suggests that term
deference is at least in part the product of motivated reasoning—the more
important it is to the individual to justify her place in the transactional
ecosystem, the more likely she is to believe that she has agency and that the
system is fair. Part IV describes the implications of this research for consumer
contract law as well as for empirical methods in legal scholarship.
II. TERM DEFERENCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY
OF CONTRACT
A. Law of Form Contracts
For the most part, American contract law treats consumer contracts as it
does person-to-person and business-to-business contracts.42 Assent to
contracts of adhesion depends on whether the parties have manifested an
intent to be legally bound. Although the doctrine of assent is the ﬂashpoint
issue for form contracting, most contemporary deals easily clear the
threshold; clicking “I agree” is certainly a clearer manifestation of assent than
we see in many casebook chestnuts.43
Consumer contracts have nonetheless vexed scholars and courts for long
enough that the American Law Institute has recently proposed a Restatement
on Consumer Contracts.44 The new Restatement would create doctrinal
boundaries between individual-firm contracts and business-to-business or
arms-length deals that have historically been the core of contracts doctrine.45
This is a remarkable development for a field that has historically insisted that
form contracts are not different than anything else. As Judge Hellerstein of the
Southern District of New York opined in a software licensing dispute in 2001:
Promises become binding when there is a meeting of the minds and
consideration is exchanged. So it was at King’s Bench in common law
42 Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar, Foreword to “Boilerplate”: Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium,
104 MICH. L. REV. 821, 826 (2006) (“On a theoretical level, boilerplate is shown to be a legal
phenomenon diﬀerent from contract. Is it a statute? Is it property? Is it a product?”).
43 See, e.g., Embry v. Hagardine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 779 (Mo. Ct. App.
1907) (holding that an employer manifested assent when he replied, “[g]o ahead, you are all right.
Get your men out, and do not let that worry you”).
44 See generally Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Searching for the
Common Law: The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 7 (2017)
(recounting and defending the empirical methods behind the draft Restatement case-counting approach).
45 See Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, The American Law
Institute’s Restatement of Consumer Contracts: Reporters’ Introduction, 15 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 91, 92
(2019) (explaining the impetus for carving consumer contracts oﬀ from commercial contracts).
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England; so it was under the common law in the American colonies; so it was
through more than two centuries of jurisprudence in this country; and so it
is today. Assent may be registered by a signature, a handshake, or a click of a
computer mouse transmitted across the invisible ether of the Internet.46

Judge Hellerstein was arguing that all online contracts do is introduce new
methods of manifesting assent, and that as such they do not disrupt assent
doctrine; they just add more behaviors that are widely understood as
agreement to contract. He was both right and wrong. Clicking “I Agree” took
little time to be widely accepted as a mode of acceptance. However, that is
not all that online contracting brought to contract doctrine. The rise and
proliferation of online contracting has arguably moved public and academic
opinion on consumer contracting for good.47 What Judge Hellerstein’s
argument missed, understandably in light of the historical context, was that
life online would yield an unprecedented volume of standard terms. The
sheer volume has, in turn, created a new urgency for those who would cleave
consumer contracts from the doctrinal core.48 It is not that we cannot identify
when consumers manifest assent, but rather that we might think it sensible
to treat them diﬀerently when nonreadership is baked into the system. As
many scholars and commentators have observed, documented, and
bemoaned, it is not possible for any humans to both read the terms of their
deals and also participate meaningfully in American economic life.49
Controversially, the ALI’s draft Restatement doubles down on the current
state of assent doctrine, and then adds a more robust set of fraud and
unconscionability protections on the back end.50 When courts face assent
Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
See generally David A. Hoﬀman, From Promise to Form: How Contracting Online Changes
Consumers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1595 (2016) (using experimental studies to show an association between
age and intuitive formalism); see also id. at 1600-06 (describing changes in contract practice between
the 1950s and 2010s).
48 See Consumer Contracts, THE ALI ADVISOR, http://thealiadviser.org/consumer-contracts
[https://perma.cc/A55D-WVXG] (last visited Oct. 8, 2020) (describing the project to create a
Restatement of Consumer Contracts).
49 See e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandatory Disclosure, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 647, 705-09 (2011) (illustrating how burdensome and useless it would be for a consumer
to read all mandatory disclosures); Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer
Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 552 (2014) (explaining why “[t]he read-all-the-terms project is
both normatively unattractive and descriptively unattainable”).
50 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft 2017) (noting the Restatement’s commitment to reﬂecting the common law’s
“relatively permissive adoption of the standard contract terms that businesses draft, balanced by a
set of substantive boundary restrictions that prohibit businesses from going too far”); see also Alan
S. Kaplinsky, ALI’s Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts: An Ill-Conceived and Poorly
Implemented Project, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (May 16, 2019), https://www.consumerﬁnance
monitor.com/2019/05/16/alis-restatement-of-the-law-consumer-contracts-an-ill-conceived-and46
47
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issues in contracts of adhesion, especially online contracts, they typically treat
the contract in isolation. Did this party in this instance have notice of the
terms and an opportunity to read them before manifesting assent? This is a
granular analysis, one that asks about the size of the font and the screen
position of the hyperlink, but has no interest in the overall rates of readership
of such terms or of the cost-beneﬁt calculation of ex ante reading.51
The upshot of this state of aﬀairs in consumer contract law is that the
black letter law is itself quite deferential to ﬁrms and terms. Consumer
contract law tolerates a range of highly dubious assent contexts, from long
boilerplate documents with “Sign Here” tabs to hyperlinked terms and
conditions to rolling contracts with terms only available after acceptance.52
Meanwhile, the dominant view is that substantive unconscionability is rarely
claimed and rarely successful.53 The most successful eﬀorts to bar predatory
or usurious practices have been legislative, prohibiting federally or state-bystate, inter alia, universal default in credit card bills,54 no-cancellation policies
for automobile purchases,55 and antidisparagement clauses.56 Targeted
legislative reforms have outlawed some objectionable practices, leaving ﬁrms
with wide latitude otherwise.
B. Field Evidence of Term Deference
If the state of the law is term deference, we might describe the state of
behavior as term over-deference. Collecting data on over-deference is
poorly-implemented-project/ [https://perma.cc/2V9R-AZS7] (criticizing Restatement provisions
about unconscionability and deception).
51 See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the ‘Opportunity to Read’ in Contract Law, 5 EUR. REV.
CONT. L., no. 1, 2009, at 2 (2009) (arguing that contract law “refuses to come to grips” with the fact
that few consumers read contracts).
52 See, e.g., Matthew A. Seligman, The Error Theory of Contract Law, 78 MD. L. REV. 147, 153,
198-200 (2018) (arguing that exploitative terms in unread ﬁne print deserve scrutiny, but that
reforms should police content rather than assent doctrine); see also Uri Beneliol & Schmuel Becher,
The Duty to Read the Unreadable, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2255, 2260 (2019) (describing the broad applicability
of the principle of a consumer’s “duty to read”).
53 Cf. Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the Law of the Poor, 102 GEO. L.J.
1383, 1387-88 (2014) (arguing that the fall of the unconscionability doctrine was coupled with a rise
in statutory reforms targeting speciﬁc terms).
54 See, e.g., Zachary J. Luck, Short Essay, Bringing Change to Credit Cards: Did the Credit CARD
Act Create a New Era of Federal Credit Card Consumer Protection?, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 205, 209
(2011) (describing the Credit CARD Act and its eﬀect on no-notice increases in interest rates in the
universal default context).
55 See, e.g., Jan M. Smits, Rethinking the Usefulness of Mandatory Rights of Withdrawal in Consumer
Contract Law: The Right to Change Your Mind?, 29 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 671, 675-76 (2011) (reviewing
cooling-off periods for automobiles and a wide range of other purchases in New York and California).
56 Eric Goldman, Understanding the Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, 24 MICH.
TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2017) (“The CRFA prevents businesses from contractually
suppressing their customers’ reviews of them.”)
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challenging, for at least two reasons. The ﬁrst is that it is a dog that doesn’t
bark—the whole point is that people do what their contracts require without
making a lot of noise (and thus without creating a lot of observable activity).
The second is that doing what one’s contract requires is normally
overdetermined; that is, it is hard to say that it has a cause that is
psychological. If I pay my Comcast bill on time, that is not psychological; I
might feel morally obligated but mostly I just want the cable company to keep
my internet on. However, a few examples have emerged recently of cases in
which it is at least plausibly the case that honoring the terms of a contract is
all-things-considered counterproductive, and yet widespread acquiescence to
bad policies persists.
1. Online Shoppers Who Didn’t Quit a 480-item Survey
About a decade ago the contracts and organizational behavior scholar Zev
Eigen put a survey online.57 Any participant who agreed to take the survey
was promised, in return, a DVD. What participants did not know was that
the survey was carefully designed to be as obnoxious as possible. It had 480
questions. The only way to answer each question was to click inside a very
small button icon, and each new question appeared on a diﬀerent part of the
screen, preventing participants from resting the mouse in a single spot. Each
question was its own pop-up, and each click to “continue” started a 4-second
delay to the next question.58 In other words, subjects signed up for something
that they almost surely understood to be a short, simple task, in return for a
relatively low-value item—these were not new release ﬁlms. Instead, they
were given a very unpleasant task that was clearly not worth the prize. We
can safely assume that a ﬁve-dollar DVD was not suﬃcient incentive to get
subjects to agree to complete an aggravating two-hour task.
At least two puzzles emerged from his ﬁndings. First, subjects answered
a lot of questions before they quit—on average, over 100.59 A small but
nontrivial number of subjects completed the entire survey.60 Second,
completion rates were higher for subjects for whom a contract was more
salient, and higher still for those for whom a contract was salient and a moral
norm was made salient. When subjects were reminded of the ﬁne print of
their deal, they gritted their teeth and kept working.61
57 Zev J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts: Experimental Evidence of Consent,
Compliance, Promise, and Performance, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 72, 82-87 (reporting results from a ﬁeld
study of online contracts to take a survey in return for a DVD).
58 Id. at 78.
59 Id. at 83.
60 Id. at 79.
61 Id. at 86.
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2. California Employees Who Didn’t Leave Their Jobs for Better Oﬀers
Noncompete clauses in employment contracts purport to limit the choices
of a worker who wants to leave her firm, ostensibly in order to protect a firm’s
investment in training and to protect trade secrets.62 These terms have been
widely criticized, especially as applied to low-level workers, and are often
unenforceable.63 Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott, and Norman Bishara have recently
shown that the terms receive deference from employees whether or not they
are legal.64 They used a national survey of employee data from U.S. labor force
participants, with 11,505 respondents covering every state. They then compared
participants on two key dimensions: first, whether or not the respondent was
himself or herself subject to a noncompete in her current job; and second,
whether the state law governing the employment contract enforced
noncompete clauses. California, for example, does not permit noncompetes, or
at least does not enforce them. They found that employees with a noncompete
were overall 5-6 percentage points more likely to report that they would not
ever move to a competitor firm. They also asked subjects whether their
noncompete agreement would be an important factor. About half of subjects
said that it would, whether they lived in a state with high enforcement or low/no
enforcement. Noncompete agreements were associated with less job mobility,
longer tenures at the employer with the noncompete, and less reported
willingness to move jobs—even without a realistic prospect of suit.
3. Homeowners Who Didn’t Walk Away
In the months and years following the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, millions of
American homeowners realized that they lived in homes worth considerably
less than their outstanding mortgage debt—they were “underwater.”
Economists predicted widespread “strategic default” in nonrecourse states;
lenders too feared that some of their clients would see that foreclosure was,
all things considered, cheaper than staying and paying, and that they would
turn over the keys to the bank and start fresh.65 What they found to be
surprising is that this did not happen, at least not in the droves they feared.
Many underwater homeowners stayed in their homes and continued paying
62 Chiara F. Orsini, Protecting an Employer’s Human Capital: Covenants Not to Compete and the
Changing Business Environment, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 176-77 (2000) (reviewing evidence and
theory in support of noncompete agreements for employees across employment sectors).
63 Rachel Argenbright Rioux, The Necessity for Employer Liability in Unenforceable Non-Compete
Agreements, 86 UMKC L. REV. 995, 996-98 (2018) (describing the widespread use of noncompete
agreements in contracts with employees unlikely to challenge or bring suit).
64 Starr et al., supra note 2, at 15-16.
65 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics of Strategic
Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547, 1548-51 (2011) (describing the strategic default predictions and
testing the role of moral norms in economic decisionmaking).
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loans for homes that would never again be worth the outstanding debt.66 Here
was another example of a widespread failure to rebel.
Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales oﬀered an answer.67 They
used survey data and found that willingness to default was strongly associated
with moral beliefs. One of the strongest negative predictors of willingness to
default was endorsement of the statement that it would be morally wrong to
walk away.68 That is, that it would be unfair of the homeowner, vis a vis the
banks and the social fabric, to undermine the system.
Each of these examples describes a situation in which we have real world
evidence that people who could get out of their contracts nonetheless stayed
on and took a real loss. Although the loss in the survey example was perhaps
a matter of a few annoying minutes, the employment and homeownership
cases involve the highest stakes of almost any contract that the average
American will ever sign. Those cases also suggest that the power that ﬁrms
have is not entirely based on the state’s willingness to put its power behind
them; deference to terms is deference both to the ﬁrm and to the system of
consumer contracting.
Deference to the “system” is something that psychologists have been
unpacking for at least ﬁfty years. The next section recounts the puzzle of
system justiﬁcation from the perspective of psychological research, and
iterates its natural connections to the phenomenon of term deference.
III. JUSTIFYING THE SYSTEM
Why would people legitimize and support social arrangements that conflict
with their own self-interest? There are hedonic benefits to minimizing the
unpredictable, unjust, and oppressive aspects of social reality.69
Readers familiar with behavioral research, in economics, sociology, or
psychology, will ﬁnd the notion of over-deference to authority quite familiar.
We see it in studies of everything from political dissent70 to abusive intimate

Id.
See generally Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, The Determinants of Attitudes
Toward Strategic Default on Mortgages, 68 J. FIN. 1473 (2013) (analyzing the nonpecuniary factors such
as morality that underlie mortgage defaults).
68 Id. at 1475-78.
69 Melvin. J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion in P ERSPECTIVES IN
S OCIAL P SYCHOLOGY: A S ERIES OF T EXTS AND M ONOGRAPHS 14 (1980).
70 See e.g., John T. Jost, Vagelis Chaikalis-Petritsis, Dominic Abrams, Jim Sidanius, Jojanneke
van der Toorn & Christopher Bratt, Why Men (And Women) Do and Don’t Rebel: Eﬀects of System
Justification on Willingness to Protest, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 197, 198 (2011) (arguing
that the motivation to obey or conform is “clearly at odds with support for protest and collective
action aimed at changing the extant social system, especially for members of disadvantaged groups”).
66
67
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relationships71 to groupthink.72 One of the core insights from various
disciplines is that compliance is psychologically more attractive—it takes
fewer personal, emotional, or cognitive resources—than protest.
Psychologists have been systematically exploring this phenomenon since at
least the 1950s, building on Stanley Milgram’s insights into obedience to form
Melvin Lerner’s just world hypothesis: “People want to and have to believe
they live in a just world so that they can go about their daily lives with a sense
of trust, hope, and conﬁdence in their future.”73 John Jost’s more complex and
testable theory of system justiﬁcation built on this foundation to move from
the just world to the justiﬁed system.74
A. A Just World Feels Good
Like many of us, the psychologist Melvin Lerner was puzzled when he
heard about Stanley Milgram’s experiments at the Yale psychology lab. After
World War II, Milgram had famously set out to show that Americans are less
blindly obedient than citizens from elsewhere. Instead he found that many
ordinary people, tasked with a learning/punishment paradigm, were willing to
shock innocent peers at outrageously high levels on nothing more than a bland
command to “continue.”75 Generations of research on obedience and
conformity shows a high rate of people going along with situations that are
otherwise not in line with their own values, preferences, or even material selfinterest. Lerner took a particular view on this research: he theorized that
people feel better when they can match personal outcomes with personal
choices—they feel better about a world in which people get what they deserve.
In the 1960s, Lerner began a systematic investigation of the informal
observation many of us have made: people seem to blame victims for their bad
luck. His first studies informed subjects that students who worked on a
particular task were then entered into a lottery for a prize; the prize winner was
chosen randomly. The subjects were asked to then assess how hard the students
worked on the task. What Lerner found was that the winner was judged to have
71 See e.g., Jessica J. Eckstein, Reasons for Staying in Intimately Violent Relationships:
Comparisons of Men and Women and Messages Communicated to Self and Others, 26 J. F AM.
V IOLENCE 21, 25-27 (2011) (studying victims of intimate partner violence and their
justifications for staying in abusive relationships, which include deference to authority
provided by views of marriage or religion).
72 See e.g., Knud S. Larsen, The Asch Conformity Experiment: Replication and Transhistorical
Comparisons, 5 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 163 (1990) (studying individuals’ willingness to
deviate from a group that is obviously wrong).
73 Lerner, supra note 69.
74 See John T. Jost & Rick Andrews, System Justification Theory, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PEACE PSYCHOLOGY loc. 2 (2011) (ebook) (deﬁning and outlining system justiﬁcation theory).
75 Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 371, 374
(1963) (“The experiment requires that you continue.”).
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worked harder on the task than the losers, a “tendency to match the student’s
performance with his fate.”76 Lerner formulated a line of research testing the
“just world hypothesis,” a set of testable predictions about human behavior:
Individuals have a need to believe that they live in a world where people
generally get what they deserve. The belief that the world is just enables the
individual to confront his physical and social environment as though they
were stable and orderly. Without such a belief it would be diﬃcult for the
individual to commit himself to the pursuit of long-range goals or even to
the socially regulated behavior of day-to-day life. Since the belief that the
world is just serves such an important adaptive function for the individual,
people are very reluctant to give up this belief, and they can be greatly
troubled if they encounter evidence that suggests that the world is not really
just or orderly after all.77

Lerner’s argument feels counterintuitive on a ﬁrst pass: people must
believe that they deserve their own bad outcomes in order to feel better?
Surely I feel worse when I have both suﬀered a harm and committed a wrong,
both worse oﬀ and guilty. Is it not preferable to believe that the ﬁrms I do
business with are bad and I am good? The insight from Lerner is that certain
kinds of blame judgments implicate a broader need for stability and optimism
rather than self-exoneration. I may think that I am right in any particular
dispute with Apple, but in a world in which my Apple products are all-butirreplaceable, it may feel better to situate myself psychologically as a party
with agency rather than a pawn to the whims of Big Business.
B. The Dissonance Resolution Motivation
At its core, the just world hypothesis tests a form of cognitive dissonance
resolution. The dissonant cognitions are (1) someone is suffering a harm and
(2) the world is fair and orderly. If the tension cannot be resolved in the world—
that is, observers cannot meaningfully remediate or eliminate the harm—then
it must be resolved within the observer herself, by changing her beliefs. As a
matter of rational processing of evidence, evidence that an innocent person is
suffering should undermine faith in a just world. The key insight of Lerner and
others was that the belief in the just world is adaptive, motivated, and strong—
so if the just world belief will not give, and the dissonance cannot stand, the
vulnerable belief is the belief in innocent suffering.

76 Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, Just World Research and the Attribution Process: Looking
Back and Ahead, 85 PSYCH. BULL. 1030, 1030 (1978).
77 Id. at 1030-31.
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The canonical example of the just world belief has been demonstrated in
the context of rape victimization. In 1973, Jones and Aronson conducted a
study in which they described the rape of either a high-status or low-status
woman, with otherwise identical details as to the nature of the attack.78 (This
study describes a set of pre-tested assumptions and a set of ﬁndings which
are embedded in a social and historical context that was quite hostile toward
women’s sexual autonomy; the method and results described here are, by
design, reinforcing pernicious gender stereotypes.) Subjects who read about
the high-status woman (in this case, a virgin) were more likely to recommend
a harsh punishment for the rapist, compared to when subjects read about the
woman of lower status (in this case, a divorcee).79 This was not surprising.
What was surprising, though, was that those subjects were also more likely to
report that the victim had engaged in risky behavior. That is, when the rape
was viewed as particularly threatening—even a virgin can be randomly
victimized!—her behavior was judged more harshly.80
In 1994, John Jost and Mahzarin Banaji pioneered a new line of
psychological research that took the just-world hypothesis and couched it in
terms of a larger set of motivated reasoning processes. They observed that
there were substantial bodies of literature devoted to the explication of
justification as a psychological process. They pointed out that researchers had
considered justiﬁcatory motivations in the context of the self and of the ingroup, but that they could not account for some consistent ﬁndings of selfor group-derogation. They proposed system justiﬁcation: the “psychological
process by which existing social arrangements are legitimized, even at the
expense of personal and group interest.”81
The consequences of system justiﬁcation are well-trodden. System
justiﬁcation makes people feel better—it is associated with increased positive
aﬀect for both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. Indeed, is hard to
overstate the importance of system justiﬁcation in the sense of self and world.
It is literally associated with mental health: “There is evidence that, at the
individual level, system-justifying beliefs and ideologies serve the palliative
function of decreasing negative aﬀect and increasing positive aﬀect and
satisfaction with one’s situation.”82
78 Cathaleene Jones & Elliot Aronson, Attribution of Fault to a Rape Victim as a Function of
Respectability of the Victim, 26 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 415, 416-17 (1973) (studying victimblaming as a function of motivated cognition).
79 Id. at 418.
80 Id. at 417-18.
81 John T. Jost & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Role of Stereotyping in System-Justification and the
Production of False Consciousness, 33 BRIT. J. OF SOC. PSYCH. 1, 2 (1994).
82 John T. Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, Antecedents and Consequences of System-Justifying Ideologies,
14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI. 260, 262 (2005).
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System justiﬁcation should be of particular interest to legal scholars
because it describes the tension at the core of much legal scholarship: what is
the relationship between is and ought? Lerner himself argued that “one of the
most commonly observed characteristics of social existence is that people
imbue social regularities with an ‘ought’ quality”.83
The study of system justiﬁcation is a study of subtle cognitive shifts, and
thus the causation question was subject to experimental manipulation by
using not actual manipulations of power but rather by manipulating the
subjective availability of power. Measuring the relationship between power
and system justiﬁcation is challenging, because many of the most salient
associations are derived from observational rather than experimental settings.
If it is true, as researchers have found repeatedly, that the experience of
powerlessness is correlated with perceived legitimacy of the socioeconomic
system,84 we should still want to know which way the causation cuts.
Psychologists at the University of California at Berkeley randomly assigned
undergraduate subjects to a powerful or a powerless condition.85 The
experimental manipulation was indirect; they were interested in the feeling
of powerlessness, and thus subjects were asked to either write about a time
when they had power over someone else, or to write about a time when
someone else had power over them. The dependent measure was the score on
a system justiﬁcation scale, including items like, “In general, I ﬁnd society to
be fair” or “Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve.”86
What the researchers found was that powerlessness yielded increased
justiﬁcation; those who had worked themselves into a more dependent
mindset were more likely to ratify existing hierarchies.87
One way to conceptualize the motivation described in the studies below is by
thinking about the just world / system justification literatures as being about
pressure and relief. When people experience themselves as helpless or dependent,
they experience a cognitive pressure to make their situation acceptable. The way
to relieve the pressure is to either change the situation (unlikely by stipulation) or
to develop a positive attitude toward the source of dependence.

Lerner, supra note 69, at 10.
See John T. Jost, Brett W. Pelham, Oliver Sheldon & Bilian Ni Sullivan, Social Inequality and
the Reduction of Ideological Dissonance on Behalf of the System: Evidence of Enhanced System Justification
Among the Disadvantaged, 33 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 13, 30 (2003) (ﬁnding that individuals with lower
income, education, or social status were more likely to justify existing systems).
85 Jojanneke van der Toorn, Matthew Feinberg, John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay, Tom R. Tyler, Robb
Willer & Caroline Wilmuth, A Sense of Powerlessness Fosters System Justification: Implications for the
Legitimation of Authority, Hierarchy, and Government, 36 POL. PSYCH. 93, 101 (2015).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 102.
83
84
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C. System Justification and Ideology
For scholars of system justiﬁcation in psychology, system justiﬁcation
might be triggered by something about a situation, but it also might be
triggered by something about the person. Numerous studies have essentially
measured system justiﬁcation as an individual variable, something stable like
a character or personality trait.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, system justification has been studied as a predictor
of political ideology, and its association with conservatism.88 The connection
is intuitive on the language alone, but it has also been borne out in the
literature. John Jost and his co-authors have looked at political conservatism
across twelve countries and concluded that conservatism is deeply connected
to system justification, providing moral and intellectual support for the status
quo.89 This result has been explored longitudinally.90 (An interesting exception
to this rule is extreme conservatism, which is associated with less system
justification).91 Jost’s commentary on “working class conservatism” identifies
the psychological advantages of conservatism.92 This research has explicitly
connected the protective psychological function of system justification with
observations that conservatives tend to be happier than liberals.93
Although the research oﬀered in this Article is not primarily focused on
individual diﬀerences, the evidence from studies of conservatism suggests
that if term deference is a motivated phenomenon, it may manifest diﬀerently
across the ideological spectrum. As such, it is treated as an important
moderating variable in the experimental research described below.
D. Fine Print as Status Quo
The close nexus between legal judgment and system justiﬁcation is easily
perceived. Law is the system. It is the traditional, inescapable articulation of
88 John T. Jost, Danielle Gaucher & Chadly Stern, “The World Isn’t Fair”: A System Justification
Perspective on Social Stratification and Inequality, in 2 APA HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY AND
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 327-29 (Mario Mikulincer & Phillip R. Shaver eds., 2015) (discussing how
the core claims of system justiﬁcation theory could explain some features of political ideology).
89 John T. Jost, Jack Glaser, Arie W. Kruglanski & Frank J. Sulloway, Political Conservatism as
Motivated Social Cognition, 129 PSYCH. BULL. 339, 366-69 (2003).
90 See generally Miriam Matthews, Shana Levin & Jim Sidanius, A Longitudinal Test of the Model
of Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, 30 POL. PSYCH. 931, 931-32 (2009).
91 See Luca Caricati, Evidence of Decreased System Justification Among Extreme Conservatives in
Non-American Samples, 159 J. SOC. PSYCH., 725, 736 (2019) (suggesting that “criticism of the existing
system is more likely on both the left and right extremes of political orientation”).
92 John T. Jost, Working Class Conservatism: A System Justification Perspective, 18 CURRENT OP.
PSYCH. 73, 77 (2017).
93 See generally Sebastian Butz, Pascal J. Kieslich & Herbert Bless, Why Are Conservatives
Happier Than Liberals? Comparing Diﬀerent Explanations Based on System Justification, Multiple Group
Membership, and Positive Adjustment, 47 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 362, 362 (2017).
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state power. Contract law is a salient instantiation of legal authority that
appears in daily life. Consumer contracting is the enforcement mechanism
for the power of ﬁrms over individuals.
About ten years ago, scholars from at least four diﬀerent methodological
disciplines began to observe and probe widespread fealty to contracts of
adhesion. Conceptually (if not always chronologically), the ﬁrst insight was
simply that it is not possible to read all the ﬁne print. In 2011, Omri BenShahar and Carl Schneider laid out in hilarious detail the ridiculous demands
that disclosures make on consumers.94 They made a convincing case that
reading contracts would be incompatible with the basic functions of human
life—you cannot hold down a job, have a social life, participate responsibly in
family obligations, and also read all your disclosures.95 Yannis Bakos,
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler and David R. Trossen analyzed a data set of
hundreds of thousands of online license agreements, and documented
readership of online agreements at a rate well below one tenth of one percent
of consumer parties.96 Victoria Plaut and Bobby Bartlett surveyed consumers
and found that the majority reported rarely reading their form contracts, with
many citing the diﬃculty (too long and/or too complex to understand) or the
lack of choice.97 In each of these studies, researchers described a world in
which individuals do not and largely cannot read the terms of their contracts,
but also one in which manifestations of assent are required to participate in
economic and social activity.
This raised a serious question for scholars interested in norms: how could
such a state of affairs be acceptable? Why did people continue to click, or continue
to perform, or continue to patronize firms requiring these practices? Even if the
answer to those questions had to do with pragmatic participation in a market with
few alternatives, why were there no high-profile op-eds or consumer advocacy
movements gaining traction? In other words: why defer to terms?
In 2014, I published a study that pinpointed, though certainly did not
resolve, the perplexing tension. Subjects read a story about a consumer
subjected to a fine that surprised him, as it was buried in the fine print of his
banking contract. Subjects were randomly assigned to read either that the
contract was very long (15 pages) or pretty short (2 pages). They answered two
important questions: (1) Was it reasonable to expect him to have known about
Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 49.
Id.
Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine
Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 21-24 (2014).
97 Victoria C. Plaut & Robert P. Bartlett, III, Blind Consent? A Social Psychological Investigation
of Non-Readership of Click-Through Agreements, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 293, 296-97, 305 (2012)
(positing a cluster of reasons that justify or bolster nonreadership, including trust in ﬁrms and trust
in government oversight).
94
95
96
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the fee? and (2) Whose fault is it that he did not know about the fee? Subjects
in the two conditions clearly differentiated as to the first question: they
thought it was unreasonable to expect readership of a long contract and
reasonable to expect it of a short contract. However, in both conditions,
subjects thought that the consumer was clearly to blame for his predicament.98
As discussed above, traditional system justification research in psychology
has been motivated by the anecdotal reports that disadvantaged groups often
support the very system that has worked to subjugate them.99 The
disadvantaged claim that their own inequitable position or outcome is the result
of a fair process. This is a reasonable way of describing the state of the
scholarship in consumer contracting: the American consumer marketplace
requires individuals to manifest consent to a range of terms without meaningful
opportunity to understand, challenge, or refuse those terms. There is little
evidence of revolt or complaint, and indeed there is ample evidence of
compliance. People comply even when compliance is costly, as in the mortgage
case, and they justify compliance by arguing that contracting as a system is fair.
Prior research in psychology predicts motivation to justify the system in
particular contexts, each of which is fundamentally associated with the sense
that something unfair needs to be rationalized.100 Recent experimental
research in contract psychology directly links to at least three relevant
factors:101
1. Inevitability. There is more pressure to justify a situation that feels
more inevitable; if it were escapable, the situation rather than the
cognition could shift. We already have evidence from contracts that
this factor is in play. I have explored the inevitability variable in a
small follow-up study reported in 2017,102 in which I asked subjects to
evaluate whether a company hiding a fee in documents not obviously
presented as part of the contract was fair or not. Half of the subjects
read that a consumer complained about the fee in small claims court
and the judge ruled it enforceable. The other half read that the judge
ruled it unenforceable. The company’s business practice was deemed
98 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 176266, 1771-74 (2014) (reporting an experimental study of consumer judgments based on procedural fairness).
99 See, e.g., Jost et al., supra note 88, at 350 (positing that a motivation to defend the system
that supports one’s livelihood may help explain why disadvantaged groups are more likely to engage
in system justiﬁcation).
100 See id. at 322 (“System justification motivation is activated (or increased) when (a) the
individual feels dependent on or controlled by the system and its authorities; (b) the status quo is
perceived as inevitable or inescapable; (c) inequality in the system is made especially salient; (d) the
system is criticized, challenged, or threatened; and (e) the system is perceived as traditional or
longstanding.”).
101 Id. at 323.
102 Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 3 at 162-64.

2020]

Justifying Bad Deals

215

overall fair when it looked enforceable, but when subjects were
introduced to the idea that it might not be so inevitable, they judged
it more harshly.
2. Inequity salience. There is more pressure to justify a bad outcome,
because it feels worse and thus requires cognitive remediation. This
is referred to in the literature as “inequity salience.” The idea is that
people are motivated to defend the system when it becomes
especially clear that the system poses a threat. This has also been
shown in the contract context. In one study in 2014, I asked subjects
to read a description of a consumer whose insurance policy included
a hidden clause prohibiting recovery for damage by vandalism.103
Subjects thought that the hidden clause was problematic—unless
they read that the policyholder had been vandalized. Once the harm
was a fait accompli, they rated the contract as more fair overall.104
3. Tradition: There is greater pressure to justify longstanding systems;
a more entrenched status quo is less malleable. This is true for
contract terms too. In one relevant study, subjects indicated that they
were more likely to defer to banks that were “conservative [and]
traditional” than those who were oﬀering novel ﬁnancial products in
the mortgage market.105 A similar ﬁnding from 2014 described a term
permitting a retailer to share personal information with third parties.
In the control condition subjects on average judged the consumer to
be slightly more to blame than the ﬁrm, but when the term was
described as “recently changed” by the drafter, the comparative
blame burden shifted to the ﬁrm.106
In the three studies that follow, I use new scenarios to sharpen these
inferences, homing in on the causal connection between these proposed triggers
of justificatory motivation and support for firm-deferential contract law.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SURVEY STUDIES
The goal of the experimental studies is to test the hypothesis that term
deference is motivated reasoning. The studies draw directly from the existing
literature in cognitive psychology on motivated reasoning, leveraging four known
predictors of justificatory pressure: inevitability, tradition, inequity, and ideology.
These studies are also exploratory. Term deference involves at least three
relevant actors: the consumer, the ﬁrm, and the state. The primary prediction
here is that attitudes toward consumer contract enforcement are motivated
103
104
105
106

See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 98, at 1768.
Id. at 1770.
See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 65, at 1567-68.
Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 98, at 1777-78.
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by psychological pressure to justify the existing system. As such, they should
be responsive to manipulations that increase or decrease that pressure.
Negative attributions about victims of bad terms (consumers) and more
positive attributions about the perpetrators of the terms (ﬁrms) should also
reﬂect the level of justiﬁcatory pressure. Third, but less clearly, these studies
aim to explore the extent to which attributions of meaningful consent are
motivated reasoning phenomena, insofar as a reasonable resolution of
dissonance is to attribute harm to the victim’s knowing consent. Finally, each
of these predictions is assessed in light of subjects’ self-reported ideological
orientation, reﬂecting the longstanding ﬁnding that political conservatism is
associated with preference for the status quo.
A. Study One: Inevitability
One of the central reasons to like the system we have is that it is not easily
changed. As anyone who compares a casebook from 2020 with a casebook
from 1950 will see, contract law is very slow to change. However, individual
terms themselves are not so immutable. Many terms are absolutely subject to
successful challenge. In this study, I predict that a term that is deemed
certainly enforceable under current law will be viewed as better (more fair,
more reasonable, reﬂecting more favorably on the ﬁrm) than the same term
described as potentially unenforceable. Although there are reasons to believe
that all else being equal, enforceable terms are actually on average more fair
and reasonable than unenforceable terms, the scenario here is designed to try
to parcel that out. In both cases, consumers receive information that the term
was recently challenged, and in both cases they have full information about
the content of the term. The dependent variable is whether, irrespective of
its legal status, enforcement of the term is fair. The central question for this
study is: does the inevitability of consumer contract enforcement motivate
positive attitudes toward terms and drafters?
1. Method
The method described in both studies here is a short vignette study. Subjects
were recruited from Prolific, an online survey platform, and were paid $1.00 to
complete a three-minute questionnaire advertised as a “Cell Phone Study.”
The vignette describes a consumer, Ashley, who is subject to an unexpected
change in her cell phone plan after she misses a single payment. Recall that
one of the predictors of system justification instantiation is the belief that the
system is inevitable. The less room for the system to move, the more
adjustment people have to do cognitively. The basic scenario read as follows:
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When Ashley bought her last phone, a new phone but an older model,
she signed up for a two-year contract with her service provider under their
Summer Unlimited Data Deal promotion. The phone company was
oﬀering an unlimited data plan plus a monthly payment plan on the phone,
which came out to about $79 per month.
Ashley signed up for the deal at the store. She asked the sales agent
about the phone’s warranty (90 days, no coverage for cracked screen) and
the late fees ($10 fee for late payment of any bill).
The paper contract the agent had her sign was quite long—around 17
total sheets of paper with pretty small print. She did not read it in the
store, but initialed each page and signed her name at the very end. The
sales agent told her where she could ﬁnd a complete copy of the terms on
their website. She did not follow up to read them.
One of the clauses in the contract read:
“39: Late Payment Plan Reversion: Promotional data rates only valid with
User’s payment plan compliance. In the event of one or more late
payments, data plan will revert to standard data pricing for the remainder
of contract term.”

Ashley’s payment slipped her mind while she was on vacation the
following August, and her payment was a week late, so she included an
extra $10. The following bill was for $115. She called the company, confused,
and they referred her to Clause 39.
Subjects in this study were randomly assigned to one of two conditions.107
In a previous study, described in Part III, I have shown that a judicial opinion
stating that an unfair term is unenforceable has a strong eﬀect on consumer
perceptions of that term.108 This study was meant to replicate that ﬁnding,
but without directly conveying that a legal authority had denounced the term.
As such, both subjects read about a challenge to the term (thus conveying in
both conditions that the term had made at least some people unhappy), but
one read that the suit was ongoing and another read it had been resolved in
favor of the ﬁrm. Resolution in favor of the ﬁrm means that the term is
literally inevitable, and ongoing suit suggests an escape route.
107 Other subjects who took this same study were exposed to four other possible conditions, pilottesting hypotheses, and stimuli related to this project. Some results were significant. However, I do not
report those results here because on review, it was clear that the wording created too many confounding
factors, including ambiguity about the facts and at least one concern about demand effects.
108 See supra text accompanying note 102.
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The customer service agent she spoke to was friendly and
sympathetic, but did not have much to oﬀer.

He told Ashley, “We’ve actually gotten sued about this
before, and the company won. This contract is here to
stay.”
The customer service agent she spoke to was friendly and
sympathetic.
He told Ashley, “We’re actually getting sued over this now.
I think there’s a chance this policy is on its way out.”

Subjects answered ﬁve follow-up statements to which subjects were asked
to respond, presented in random order:
• Consent: Ashley consented to Clause 39 imposing the late
payment data plan reversion.
• Fair Law: A law enforcing the clause is fair.
• Reasonable Practice: This contract reﬂects a reasonable business
practice by the company.
• Consumer Blame: Shown in Figure 1
• Company Blame: Shown in Figure 1
Figure 1: Blame response sliding indicators

2. Results
In total, 989 subjects participated via the online research platform
Proliﬁc; 51.8% of subjects were male. Ages ranged from 18 to 72 with a median
age of 28. On a 100-point scale where 0 was “Extremely Conservative” and
100 was “Extremely Liberal,” the median subject rated their political views at
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64, and fewer than one quarter of subjects indicated that they were more
conservative than 50. The subjects were split: 189 were randomly assigned to
the Inevitable condition and 175 were assigned to the Escapable condition.
There were no diﬀerences in political aﬃliation by condition.
a. Main Eﬀects of Manipulation
The predicted eﬀect of the experimental manipulation was that when the
term seemed less vulnerable to challenge, the inevitability would increase
pressure on subjects to justify consumer contract enforcement. The data bore
this out here. When the term withstood legal challenge, subjects thought that
enforcement was more fair (W=188862, p=.014), that the customer was more
at fault (W=18673.5, p=.025), and that the company was less at fault
(W=14245, p=.073).109 Neither the Consent nor the Reasonable Practice
variables were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent by condition. Figure 2 shows the main
results as mean comparisons.
Figure 2: Mean Responses, by Inevitability Condition, for Each Response
Variable

Inevitability Manipulation
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109 Statistical significance is tested using Wilcoxon rank-sum tests here. A rank-sum statistical
test tests the null hypothesis that one median in a pair is not higher or lower than the other—i.e., is
not predictably ranked higher (rather than the more familiar t-test, which tests the null hypothesis
that two samples have the same mean). This is a more conservative test of significance than the t-test,
but it does not assume normal distribution, which is largely more appropriate for Likert-scale data.
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b. Results by Ideology
In an exploratory analysis of these results, in part to conﬁrm the
mechanism, results were also parsed by political aﬃliation. First, I ran a
simple linear regression with politics, age, and sex as the independent
variables and each response variable as the dependent variable. For
simpliﬁcation, I report the estimate and the signiﬁcance level only (where *
is p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p <.01).
Table 2: Regression Coeﬃcients of Political Aﬃliation, Age, and Sex for
Each Response Variable.

Fair Law
Consumer Fault
Company Fault
Reasonable Practice
Consent

Politics
-.006
-.139***
.275***
-.014***
-.006*

Age
-.014
.164
-.051
-.006
.001

Sex
-.326*
.743
.513
-.007
.141

As the table shows, for Consent, Consumer Fault, Company Fault, and
Reasonable Practice, ideology was signiﬁcantly predictive of subject
responses, collapsing across conditions. The direction of the eﬀect was as
expected: conservative subjects were statistically more likely to support
enforcement, infer consent, blame the consumer, and favor the ﬁrm.
Previous work on motivated reasoning and political beliefs suggests that
ideology may not only predict an overall aﬃnity for reinforcing the status
quo, but that it may also interact with a trigger, such as inevitability—that
some people are more responsive than others to systems salience
manipulations. I conducted this analysis bluntly: I divided subjects into two
groups, with 50 and below classiﬁed as “conservative” and 51 and above
classiﬁed as “liberal.” This yielded 125 conservative subjects and 239 liberal
subjects. (Note that both here and in the following studies, the response
midpoint—here 50—is coded as conservative. Although it is not strictly
important where the cut is made, since any cut bifurcates the sample into
“more liberal” and “more conservative,” the choice to include subjects who are
presumably indicating that they view themselves as moderate in the
conservative group reﬂects an emerging body of literature suggesting a liberal
skew in self-reported indices of political ideology.110)
110 See, e.g., Andy Brownback & Aaron Novotny, Social Desirability Bias and Polling Errors in the 2016
Presidential Election, 74 J. BEHAV. & EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 38, 44 (2018) (documenting the relationship
between anti-conservative social desirability beliefs and pro-liberal polling bias in the 2016 election).
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First, collapsing across conditions, as I reported above, conservative
subjects as a group were signiﬁcantly more likely to ﬁnd consent, to blame
Ashley, to not blame the ﬁrm, and to ﬁnd the business practice reasonable.
Second, there were no clear interactions for consent or reasonable practice
(both groups stayed relatively even across conditions). There were also no
interaction eﬀects for the Fair Law question; both groups found the law more
fair when it was inevitable. Comparisons are illustrated in Figures 3-6.111
3. Discussion of Study One Results
Study One showed some clear patterns and some suggestive puzzles.
First, all subjects were more likely to judge a law enforcing the term as fair
when they learned that a challenge to the term had failed in court—that is,
when they understood that enforcement was indeed the law rather than when
enforcement was uncertain. Enforcement, here the operationalization of
inevitability, predicted justiﬁcation of the system.
This pattern also played out for the blame variables, but it was more
nuanced. Conservative subjects blamed the consumer more than the company
whether or not the term was certainly enforceable. Liberal subjects, on the
other hand, blamed the company more than the consumer when enforcement
was uncertain, and the consumer more than the ﬁrm when it was inevitable.
The Reasonable Practice variable, meant to be a judgment of whether the
ﬁrm’s behavior was acceptable (justiﬁed) was highly related to ideology and
unaﬀected by the experimental manipulation. Overall, subjects found the
company’s behavior to be neutral-to-slightly unreasonable.
Finally, Consent was weakly associated with conservatism in the
regression analysis, but unaﬀected by the experimental manipulation.
Perhaps the most striking result here was the overall valence of consent
responses. Very few subjects thought that Ashley had not consented. In fact,
74% of subjects found unequivocal consent to the term, and only 17% thought
she had not consented. The median rating of consent on the 1-7 scale was 6.
This is a striking result, insofar as it suggests that whether or not subjects
thought Ashley was the victim of an unfair ﬁrm or an unfair rule, they viewed
her participation as consent.

111 Statistical comparisons for Fair, Consumer Blame, and Company Blame, by ideology, are
reported here. Law is fair, Conservative: W=2249.5, p=.123; Liberal: W=8116, p=.046. Consumer to
Blame, Conservative: W=1900.5, p=.820 vs. Liberal: W=8690, p=.002. Company to Blame,
Conservative: W=1929.5, p=.823 vs. Liberal: W=5620, p=.014.
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B. Study Two: Tradition, Inequity, and Ideology
The second study takes up two additional predictors of motivated
reasoning: inequity salience and longevity. Previous research argues that
motivation to defend the status quo increases when there is something to
defend—that is, when a harm or inequity becomes more salient. Separate
studies also oﬀer evidence that motivation to defend the status quo increases
when the status quo appears entrenched over a long time.
Study Two essentially takes the predictions of tradition and inequity
salience and turns them on their heads. It uses a control scenario in which the
contract is explicitly harmful to the protagonist and implicitly standard or
longstanding, and then uses experimental manipulations designed to take the
justiﬁcatory pressure oﬀ the subject.
In No Harm, subjects see either the core scenario, in which Ashley is
removed from the cheaper phone plan, or a scenario with no salient harm—
reducing the motivation to justify the term because there is no harm to
assimilate. In New Term, subjects see either the core scenario or a scenario
that suggests that the term is a novel practice for the ﬁrm, which is predicted
to make it less urgent to defend.
1. Method
Study Two used the same core scenario from Study One. In Study Two,
the control condition was the same base scenario described above, with no
additional narrative describing any conversation with the sales representative.
Instead, the two comparison conditions were: No Harm and New Contract.
Both of these conditions are compared to the core scenario from Study One.
The No Harm condition removes the information about the charges Ashley
faced, and the New Contract condition includes information that the contract
terms were newly drafted. Exact language is below:
NO HARM
...
The paper contract the agent
had her sign was quite long—
around 17 total sheets of paper with
pretty small print. She did not read
it in the store, but initialed each
page and signed her name at the
very end. The sales agent told her
where she could ﬁnd a complete

HARM
...
The paper contract the agent
had her sign was quite long—
around 17 total sheets of paper with
pretty small print. She did not read
it in the store, but initialed each
page and signed her name at the
very end. The sales agent told her
where she could ﬁnd a complete
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copy of the terms on their website. copy of the terms on their website.
She did not follow up to read them. She did not follow up to read them.
One of the clauses in the
One of the clauses in the
contract read:
contract read:
“39: Late Payment Plan
Reversion: Promotional data
rates only valid with User’s
payment plan compliance. In
the event of one or more late
payments, data plan will revert
to standard data pricing for the
remainder of contract term.”

“39: Late Payment Plan
Reversion: Promotional data
rates only valid with User’s
payment plan compliance. In
the event of one or more late
payments, data plan will revert
to standard data pricing for the
remainder of contract term.”

Ashley’s payment slipped her
mind while she was on vacation the
following August, and her payment
was a week late, so she included an
extra $10. The following bill was for
$115. She called the company,
confused, and they referred her to
Clause 39.
NEW
...
The paper contract the agent
had her sign was quite long—
around 17 total sheets of paper with
pretty small print. The sales agent
said, “The legal team just added in
a bunch of terms, so this is hot oﬀ
the presses!” She did not read it in
the store, but initialed each page
and signed her name at the very
end. The sales agent told her where
she could ﬁnd a complete copy of
the terms on their website. She did
not follow up to read them.
One of the new clauses in the
contract read:
“39: Late Payment Plan
Reversion: Promotional data

TRADITIONAL
...
The paper contract the agent
had her sign was quite long—
around 17 total sheets of paper with
pretty small print. She did not read
it in the store, but initialed each
page and signed her name at the
very end. The sales agent told her
where she could ﬁnd a complete
copy of the terms on their website.
She did not follow up to read them.
One of the clauses in the
contract read:
“39: Late Payment Plan
Reversion: Promotional data
rates only valid with User’s
payment plan compliance. In
the event of one or more late
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rates only valid with User’s
payment plan compliance. In
the event of one or more late
payments, data plan will revert
to standard data pricing for the
remainder of contract term.”

Ashley’s payment slipped her
mind while she was on vacation the
following August, and her payment
was a week late, so she included an
extra $10. The following bill was for
$115. She called the company,
confused, and they referred her to
Clause 39.
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payments, data plan will revert
to standard data pricing for the
remainder of contract term.”

Ashley’s payment slipped her
mind while she was on vacation the
following August, and her payment
was a week late, so she included an
extra $10. The following bill was for
$115. She called the company,
confused, and they referred her to
Clause 39.

2. Results
800 subjects were paid $0.75-$1.00 to complete a 3-minute
questionnaire.112 43.8% of respondents were male. Ages ranged from 18 to 74
with a median age of 29. Political ideology was measured on a 0-7 scale, where
0 was Extremely Conservative, 3-4 was Moderate, and 7 was Extremely
Liberal. The median response was 5 and the modal response was 4, with a
mean of 4.6. There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in political ideology by
condition.
In order to compare some basic effects of ideology, I isolated the data from
the control condition only. Regression coefficients including ideology, age, and
sex are reported in note 110, and means are reported in Table 3.113 Political
Ideology here is reported as a binary variable with 1-4 coded as Conservative and
5-7 coded as Liberal. These results draw only from the control condition, which
had 107 subjects coded as Conservative and 145 subjects coded as Liberal.114
112 The variable payment was an error; all subjects were supposed to be paid $1.00. There were
no diﬀerences in results by payment level.
113 Study Two regression coeﬃcients of Political Aﬃliation, Age, and Sex for each response
variable (control condition only):
POLITICS
AGE
SEX
Consent
.105*
.018
-.018**
Fair Law
-.263***
-.012
.159
Consumer Fault
-2.35**
.044
6.93**
Company Fault
2.38**
-.103
-4.81
Reasonable Practice
-.181**
-.004
.048
114 Only control condition only is used here in order to test the effect of ideology in a single snapshot
rather than aggregating across conditions, where we might expect the effect of ideology to vary by condition.
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Table 3: Study Two Mean Diﬀerences for Response Variables, Control
Condition Only, by Political Ideology

Conservative

Liberal

p-value115

5.25
4.50***
71.23**
47.60
4.09**

5.47
3.79
62.95
52.83
3.66

.226
.001
.019
.174
.043

Consent
Fair Law
Consumer Fault
Company Fault
Reasonable Practice

Liberalism was associated with ﬁnding the law to be less fair, the
consumer to be less to blame, and the business practice to be less reasonable.
a. No Harm (Nonsalient Inequity)
There was no main effect (that is, no effect by condition without dividing the
sample by ideology) for Consent, Fair Law, or Reasonable Practice. There were
main effects by condition for both blame variables in the predicted directions,116
meaning that when there was no harm resulting from the term, subjects were
more likely to blame the company and less likely to blame the consumer.
Liberal subjects did not significantly differentiate between the No Harm
and Harm conditions.117 Conservative subjects found the law significantly more
fair when the bad term led to a harm.118 This effect is illustrated in Figure 3.
A similar pattern emerged for Consumer Blame. Liberal subjects did not
signiﬁcantly diﬀer by condition. Conservative subjects levied substantially
more blame against the consumer when they learned there was a concrete
harm from the term.119 These eﬀects are pictured in Figure 4.
b. New Term (Nontraditional)
For the New Term test, the prediction was that the newly-drafted
contract, because it is less “traditional or long-standing,” should provoke less
pressure to justify, and therefore should be viewed as less fair, less the
consumer’s fault, and more the ﬁrm’s fault.
There was a significant main effect of the manipulation on Consent,
Company Fault, and, marginally, on Reasonable Practice. There was no main
All p-values calculated from Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.
Consumer Blame: No Harm 61.9, Harm 66.5 (W=28759.5, p=.017). Company Blame: No
Harm 54.7, Harm 50.5 (W=34850, p=.080).
117 W=10897, p=.328.
118 W=5114.5, p=.013.
119 W=4940.5, p=.006.
115
116
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effect on Consumer Fault or Fair Law, though both trended in the predicted
direction. Overall, subjects were more likely to indicate that the consumer had
consented to the term when the term was traditional (W=39928.5, p=.028).
Subjects were marginally less likely to find the company’s practice reasonable
in the New Term condition, but the difference was not statistically significant
(New Term mean: 3.62, Traditional Term mean: 3.85, W=38539.5, p=.119).
Liberal subjects did not diﬀerentiate signiﬁcantly between the New Term
and Control contract condition for the Fair variable (W=11450 p=.928).
Conservative subjects found the law signiﬁcantly less fair in the New Term
condition (W=7738, p=.027). The same pattern emerged for the Consumer
Fault variable (Liberal: W=10917, p=.751; Conservative: W=7670.5, p=.040).
In Study Two, the pattern of results on the Fair and Blame variables is almost
exactly what prior research would predict. For conservative but not liberal
subjects, the law is fair and the consumer is to blame unless the justificatory
pressure is reduced by either lack of harm or by a nontraditional term.
The consent results here are uneven. Subjects overall indicated
substantially less consent to a new term. It is possible that this pattern is also
latent in the Harm manipulation, where those who did not see a harm were
less certain about consent than those who did see the harm, but there is not
enough power here to discern whether this trend is robust.
C. Summary Results for Studies One and Two: Fairness, Blame, Ideology, and
Motivation
Figures 3-6 below aggregate results from Studies One and Two for two
main variables of interest: (1) Is the law fair?, and (2) Is the consumer to
blame? These charts are presented in pairs for purposes of comparison. They
show the eﬀects for each manipulation for conservatives and for liberals,
respectively. Note that in each case signiﬁcant diﬀerences are marked on
histograms with an asterisk (*) symbol. Signiﬁcance tests are reported above.
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Figure 3: Eﬀect of Experimental Manipulations on Judgments of Fairness,
Conservative Subjects
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Figure 4: Eﬀect of Experimental Manipulations on Judgments of Fairness,
Liberal Subjects
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Figure 5: Eﬀect of Experimental Manipulations on Judgments of
Consumer Blameworthiness, Conservative Subjects
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Figure 6: Eﬀect of Experimental Manipulations on Judgments of
Consumer Blameworthiness, Liberal Subjects
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V. DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS
A. Discussion of Results
The broad hypothesis of the studies here is that term deference is a
motivated reasoning phenomenon that increases with intensity as individuals
feel increased psychological pressure to align their attitudes with the status
quo. I measured deference in two primary ways: perceived fairness of the law,
and allocation of blame between the parties. The more fair the law, and the
more blame shouldered by the consumer, the more deference. The prediction
for each study was that as subjects felt more psychological pressure to justify
a contract, they would be more deferential to both the term and the law.
In order to operationalize the psychological pressure, I borrowed from the
system justification literature. In particular, I borrowed two main findings. The
first is that people feel more pressure to justify a system when the inequitable
results of the system are salient—i.e., when the system seems worse there is a
greater need to rationalize it. The second is that people feel more pressure to
justify a system when the system seems particularly entrenched. The idea here
is that when a bad outcome can be remediated or avoided with action, people
often choose that path. When the outcomes are unmovable, it is the perceptions
that must change instead. Study One operationalized that intransigence by
making either the law or the contract seem more or less open to challenge, and
Study Two operationalized it by casting the term as either a standard part of an
existing contract or a new term recently added.
The motivated reasoning literature in psychology measures not only
situational triggers but also individual diﬀerences. System justiﬁcation is
associated with, among other things, political conservatism. As such, I also
explored the possibility that I would see stronger results among conservative
respondents than among liberal respondents, which I tested more
systematically in Study Two.
The results showed a consistent pattern: subjects overall responded to the
Fairness and Blame questions as predicted. When there was more pressure to
justify the system—when the consumer had been hit by the term’s penalty,
the contract was standard, or the law was clearly in favor of the drafter—
subjects found the law more fair, the company less to blame, and the consumer
more to blame.
Overall, term deference was associated with conservatism. This was
true whether I compared responses to a single scenario, or whether I
compared the effects of the experimental manipulations for conservative
versus liberal respondents.
Finally, the consent variable did not yield any easily summarized patterns.
The one manipulation that showed clear results was that subjects were less
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likely to think that the consumer had consented to the new term than to the
control. Otherwise consent was only marginally associated with political
ideology, and the sign reversed from Study One to Study Two. Perhaps the
most important data point on assent was the widespread agreement among
subjects that the consumer did consent. The median consent rating in Study
One was 6 out of 7. Even as the other variables shifted and hovered around the
midpoint, consent ratings were very high. This is essentially a null result, but I
discuss some possible interpretations in line with parallel scholarship below.
In sum, these results come together to oﬀer at least proof of concept:
deference to contract terms increases with increased psychological pressure
to justify the existing regime. This is evidence to support the proposition that
acceptance of terms is a motivated reasoning phenomenon. It feels better to
believe that the system works.
B. Implications for Contract Law
1. Rhetoric
One of the persistent challenges for descriptive research in legal
scholarship is the jump from a characterization of what the world is like to a
prescription for what law should be like.120 To start cautiously: this research
suggests that existing legal rules may be out of line with evolving norms or
technologies and perhaps insufficiently protective of consumer vulnerabilities.
It is not obvious that contract law itself is the right medium for increasing
challenges to bad terms, but it is the case that judicial rhetoric—i.e., the way
courts talk about assent—has not caught up to the modern realities of
consumer contracting.121 Granular assent analyses with detailed attention to
the location of the hyperlink or the size of a font are not transparent about the
state of modern readership.122 One of the benefits of loosening assent analysis,
as in the proposed Restatement of Consumer Contracts draft, is the possibility

120 See generally Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and
Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1593 (2014) (articulating a frustration with the limited normative and
prescriptive arguments from traditional descriptive scholarship).
121 See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Nancy S. Kim, Christina L. Kunz, Peter Linzer, Patricia A.
McCoy, Juliet M. Moringiello, Elizabeth A. Renuart & Lauren E. Willis, The Faulty Foundation of
the Draft Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 36 YALE J. REG. 447, 448 (2019) (expressing a belief that
the Draft Restatement does not accurately restate the law).
122 See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 3, at 127-28 (“All told, the law of assent in consumer
contracting leaves us in an uneasy place: anyone reading a judicial opinion in contract law would
have no reason to think that assent to standard terms is dead. But surely analyzing assent to
consumer contracts in any kind of granular way is disingenuous when we all know that consumer
contracts are unreadable all the time, no matter how close or how far the link to the ‘Privacy Policy’
is to the ‘Checkout’ button.”).
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that courts might be more frank about the tradeoffs they are making.123 Courts
might admit that almost any hidden term is as nonsalient as any other, and
that the consumer’s “duty to read” is no longer analytically sensible, much less
dispositive. Whether or not we agree with what courts are deciding, it seems
clear that courts are not justifying their decisions in terms of the realities of
the world their litigants inhabit.124 This is a critique of assent rhetoric, a
suggestion that courts could serve as a counterpoint to the cultural tropes of
the feckless consumer described in Part I.
2. Enforcing Unenforceability: Reforming or Disrupting
By contrast, the doctrinal implications that rise to the fore from this
research are largely about allocating rights and remedies when parties—either
parties to the contract or public agencies—bring into court a contract with
unenforceable terms. Any student of contract law is familiar with the
remedies for breach of contract: expectation damages,125 reliance damages,126
maybe speciﬁc performance if you’re very lucky and/or transferring land.127
But most scholars have spent much less time on the “remedies” for bad
terms.128 In this section, I brieﬂy outline two ways that courts approach bad
deals. The ﬁrst is a form of reformation—the idea that the court seeks to
reform the contract to bring it in line with a version of the deal that is legally
acceptable.129 The second approach is a sort of blowing-up rather than a
smoothing-over; a court might treat the unenforceable term as a reason to
trash the deal rather than repair it.
123 See RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. 12 (AM. L. INST., Discussion
Draft April 2017) (on file with author) (“Thus, the ‘grand bargain’ that the common law of consumer
contracts reflects allows for relatively easy adoption of the standard contract terms that businesses draft,
balanced by a set of substantive boundary restrictions that prohibit businesses from going too far.”).
124 See, e.g., Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 49, at 579-80 (proposing to solve the problem of
nonreadership with updated empirical information about consumer expectations).
125 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 629, 637 (1988) (describing the incentive effects of the default rule of expectation damages).
126 See, e.g., L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46
YALE. L.J. 52, 54 (1936) (explaining the interests and goals of reliance damages).
127 See, e.g., Henry Cox, Specific Performance of Contracts to Sell Land, 16 KY. L.J. 338, 338 (1927)
(“Whatever the explanation may be, it is generally undisputed that where land or any interest in
land is the subject matter of an agreement, equity has jurisdiction to enforce speciﬁc performance,
and it does not depend upon the inadequacy of the legal remedy in the particular case.”).
128 Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, 63 STAN. L. REV. 869, 869 (2011) (“A large
literature has explored the question which terms should be viewed as unfair, but a related question
has never been studied systematically—what provision should replace the vacated unfair term? How
should a distributively unfair contract be ﬁxed?”).
129 For a traditional analysis of the meaning of reformation in contracts, see George E. Palmer,
The Eﬀect of Misunderstanding on Contract Formation and Reformation Under the Restatement of Contracts
Second, 65 MICH. L. REV. 33, 52 (1966), which describes the option of reforming—i.e., judicially
ﬁxing—contracts that are based on misunderstanding.
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a. Reformation
In the first-year contracts course, students learn that the remedy for a
contract based on a misrepresentation or an unconscionable deal is that the
contract is void and the consumers go back to square one: restitution damages,
the deal unwound, and the parties extricated from one another.130 But what
happens if a contract includes a single unenforceable term? What happens if a
contract includes, for example, a stipulated damages clause that is
unenforceable as a penalty?131 In that case, does the court declare that the
parties have no obligations to one another? No, the court strikes the clause and
replaces it with the default remedy of judicially-determined expectation
damages.132 The same is true for unfair terms generally. The default position
in contract law is that contracts are severable such that unenforceable terms
can be excised from the contract without destroying the rest of the
obligations.133 Courts then choose how to fill the gap left by the severed term:
a “reasonable” gap-filler, a punitive term, or a solution that is “minimally
tolerable.”134 These solutions aim largely to reform the deal: to move the
parties from an unacceptable deal to a deal that is both viable in court and that
approximates a deal that would be acceptable to similarly situated parties.135
A majoritarian approach, constrained by doctrinal accounts of fairness,
appears eminently reasonable on its face. However, the experimental research
from psychology, including the study reported here, gives us reason for
concern about a reformative approach. Reformation removes bad terms as
quietly as possible, and that quiet helps sustain an overall impression that
130 See, e.g., Edward S. Thurston, Recent Developments in Restitution: Rescission and Reformation
for Mistake, Including Misrepresentation, 46 MICH. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (1948) (deﬁning the concept of
restitution damages).
131 See, e.g., Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Eﬃciency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 147, 147 (1984) (discussing the penalty doctrine and what happens when a court
refuses to enforce a contract provision).
132 See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Eﬃcient Breach, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 554, 555 (1977) (explaining that courts frequently invalidate penalty clauses that
are deemed in terrorem, instead bestowing other “just compensation”).
133 See, e.g., Mark L. Movesesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REV. 41, 47-48 (1995)
(“A court will sever an illegal term and enforce the remainder of an otherwise valid contract, but only
where the illegal term ‘is not an essential part of the agreed exchange’. Whether a given provision is an
essential part of the agreed exchange turns on the intent of the parties to the contract.” (footnote omitted)).
134 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 130, at 879 (“Drafting a contract that contains terms other than
the most reasonable ones is not illegal nor is it uncommon. It is only when these advantages are
excessive—when they reach beyond a level that is regarded as tolerable—that the law steps in to
invalidate them. Thus, if a court is to reform the unfair contract, it is only the illegitimate element
of the one-sided term that needs to be struck. Eﬀectively, then, the court would ﬁll the gap with a
term that is still one-sided, still favorable to the same party who dictated the original excessive term,
but moderated suﬃciently so that it would be tolerable . . . .”).
135 Id.
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consumer contracts are functionally law. The reformation preserves the status
quo largely through its perverse incentives for firms. When the only cost to a
company for including a bad term is that the term will be cleanly removed by
a court and replaced with something slightly-less-firm-favoring, the expected
value of the term is positive.136 Sometimes people will do what the term says
without challenging it,137 sometimes a court will strike it down;138 at worst, it’s
a little bit useful as leverage outside the courts,139 and at best, it heads off
complaints before they even make it to the customer service agent.140
Further, for younger people, the more unenforceable terms exist, the more
normal they seem.141 One of the key ﬁndings in David Hoﬀman’s inﬂuential
2016 article on age and contracting was that younger subjects, those who grew
up with the internet, were more likely to be “formalists on steroids.”142 His
experiments suggested that those who were more familiar with contracts via
online contracting were less likely to predict that terms could be
unenforceable on the basis of unconscionability. He surmised that
“millennials indeed naively believe that contract law does not account for
fairness or moral norms, but is instead a bit of a game.”143 The argument here
is that the terms that you see shape what you think contract law is. To the
extent that boilerplate looks impregnable, it will feed the very justiﬁcatory
phenomenon I have described experimentally—it will retain the sense that it
is foundational and unremarkable rather than the unstable results of in-house
counsel adding terms prophylactically over time.

136 See generally Steven Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q.J. ECON.
121, 147 (1984) (formally modeling expected value of contracts terms under conditions of traditional
remedies for breach).
137 See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 3, at 164 (summarizing the results of an experimental
study showing that contract policies were more likely to go unchallenged than identical policies in
a noncontract form).
138 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine,
Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 304 (1995)
(discussing the use of the unconscionability doctrine to strike down even contracts with no price disparity).
139 See, e.g., Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract Schemas:
A Preliminary Investigation of the Eﬀects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83, 91 (1997) (reporting a study that a sample of readers who saw a gym contract
with an unenforceably broad limitation on liability for the gym reported that they would be less
likely to sue in the event of injury than if the clause were not present).
140 See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 3, at 164 (suggesting that rules taking the form of a contract
automatically engender more adherence and acceptance among consumers).
141 See Hoﬀman, supra note 47, at 1626.
142 Id. at 1624.
143 Id. at 1627.
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b. Disruption
When consumers are over-deferential to terms, we ought to worry about
a counterproductive inhibition to challenge and debate. When unenforceable
terms may be voided by a court, but ﬁrms are not otherwise penalized, those
terms will persist.144 By contrast, courts and legislatures have a robust toolkit
of remedial approaches that might be productively disruptive. We can think
of diﬀerent ways of approaching bad terms as existing on a continuum from
very accommodating to very disruptive. Accommodation here refers to the
extent to which the court accommodates the contract and the parties,
identifying a solution that tries to repair and smooth. A very accommodating
approach might be severability plus a term that is basically ﬁrm-favorable. A
very disruptive approach, on the other hand, might be a public FTC action
with monetary penalties for any unfair practices.145 This is disruptive in the
sense that it creates a noisy remedy and potentially destroys salvageable
pieces of the parties’ deal. And, of course, there are a series of potential
approaches in between, some of which are highlighted below.
i. Refusal to Sever Bad Terms
Although some of the most famous cases of unconscionable terms in
contract go to the core of the deal, most of the terms I have described in this
Article are part of the boilerplate—these are terms about arbitration, or
limitations on liability, or class action waivers. In such cases, it is the default
approach of courts faced with an unenforceable term to excise that term and
interpret the remainder of the contract. And in the case of mass market forms,
severability will often be an explicit term, instructing the court that any single
unenforceable term should not aﬀect the enforceability of the contract as a
whole. This approach, described above as a species of reformation, is both
quite ﬁrm-favorable and highly nonsalient to the ordinary consumer. Refusal
to sever is just the opposite; it oﬀers a noisy, disruptive remedy that is aversive
enough to the ﬁrm that it is likely to change ﬁrm drafting practices.
An example from Philadelphia’s housing code provides a good proof of
concept. The city recently implemented a new regulation: in order for a
landlord to begin eviction proceedings or otherwise bring a claim against a
144 See, e.g., Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms:
Evidence from the Residential Rental Market, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 45 (2017) (positing that
regulation for consumer protection fails when there is no adequate monitoring, as sellers might
neglect to comply with that regulation, resulting in standard form contracts that misinform
consumers about the law).
145 See generally Greg Dickenson, Survey of Recent FTC Privacy Enforcement Actions and
Developments, 70 BUS. LAW. 247, 247 (2015) (reviewing FTC enforcement actions against “unfair”
security practices).

2020]

Justifying Bad Deals

235

tenant, the landlord must show a lease in compliance with local regulations.146
Leases are notoriously rife with unenforceable terms; for example, landlords
often claim no liability for dangerous conditions.147 The landlords who want
to be able to leverage a lease, therefore, have an incentive to bring it into
compliance. This type of remedy restructures the incentives for the drafters,
introducing a positive probability of ﬁnancial losses if bad terms come to
light—if you want to include unenforceable terms, you risk the possibility
that the court will deem the entire instrument unenforceable.
ii. Civil Fines
Imposing ﬁnes is an even more explicit reordering of incentives and the
mechanism some state statutes rely on for deterring aggressive actions against
consumers. One way to penalize, and thus deter, the inclusion of
unenforceable terms is for courts to impose direct ﬁnancial costs when they
see them. California’s “Yelp law” statutes operate in this way.148 The state of
California has outlawed antidisparagement clauses that would prevent
consumers from complaining online about negative experiences with ﬁrms,
doctors, restaurants, or other sellers.149 Firms who include such terms, and
try to enforce them, are subject to a civil penalty.150 These kinds of
mechanisms can shift the incentives for ﬁrms to promulgate contracts that
are, at the least, in line with existing legal rules.151 Civil ﬁnes for ﬁrms with
bad terms could be pushed even further by creating a private cause of action.
California’s antidisparagement remedy does not kick in until the ﬁrm tries to
bring a legal action, meaning that it oﬀers essentially a defense for the
consumer. In the same way that consumers can bring complaints under
federal and state Unfair and Deceptive Practices statutes for misleading

146 See Jake Blumgart, Philadelphia Renters Just Scored a Courtroom Win, WHYY (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://whyy.org/articles/philadelphia-renters-just-scored-a-courtroom-win/3/ [https://perma.cc/
GEP7-T8VG] (“Under the new rule, if a landlord is seeking back rent or eviction, and they can’t
show a certiﬁcate of rental suitability for the entire period attached to the complaint, the court will
not enter a default judgment or judgment by agreement.”).
147 See, e.g., Furth-Matzkin, supra note 146, at 17 (ﬁnding many leases in Massachusetts that
indemniﬁed the landlord from liability, contrary to Massachusetts law).
148 See generally Eric Goldman, Understanding the Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, 24
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 9 (2017) (describing the genesis and impact of California’s
legislative eﬀort to ban antidisparagement clauses).
149 Id. at 2 (explaining that the Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016’s goal of safeguarding
the ability to lodge public complaints to facilitate an eﬃcient market).
150 See, e.g., Wayne Barnes, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Online Reviews: The Trouble with
Trolls and a Role for Contract Law After the Consumer Review Fairness Act, 53 GA. L. REV. 549, 599600 n.244 (2018) (describing the civil penalty structure for violations of California’s law).
151 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 130, at 878-85 (outlining a conceptual framework for
understanding the incentive eﬀects of judicial responses to bad terms).
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statements of fact,152 legislatures could authorize a private right of action
against ﬁrms that purport to require impermissible promises from their
consumers. A private right of action would incentivize a crowdsourced hunt
for unenforceable terms by consumers, and thus dramatically increase the
probability of detection.
iii. Public Actions
Finally, and perhaps most disruptively, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) and/or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
could bring public actions against ﬁrms promulgating unenforceable deals.
This is, of course, a core part of the enforcement power of both agencies, and
indeed their current actions feature some of the same core analytic claims.
Both the CFPB and the FTC are authorized to ﬁle claims in federal court or
to initiate administrative proceedings against a company charged with
consumer violations.153 Such actions are not unusual, even in administrations
with more conservative consumer protection goals. For example, in 2018, the
CFPB required CitiBank to pay $335 million in restitution to credit card
holders who paid more in APR than they should have been required to pay.154
In 2019, the FTC settled with AT&T to enjoin the wireless company from
promising “unlimited data” but not specifying data speeds, which were
reduced with high use.155 And in 2020, the CFPB sued Think Finance for
collecting debts against tribal borrowers for loan terms that were
impermissible under state law.156 In each of these cases, we can characterize
the agency action as essentially a response to a bad term. If, however, we were
interested in creating more robust challenges to consumer contracts, we could
suggest that agencies have the ability to bring actions against ﬁrms with
unenforceable terms even when the terms have not caused concrete losses to
consumers. Unenforceable class action waivers, for example, may not in
152 See, e.g., Jeﬀ Sovern, Private Actions Under Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: Reconsidering the
FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 437 (1991) (“Most states—in an eﬀort further to
discourage inappropriate trade practices and to compensate injured consumers—have extended to
private consumers the right to sue for deceptive and, in some states, unfair trade practices.”).
153 See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 344-358 (2013) (describing the limitations on the entities covered by CFPB
enforcement authority).
154 Citibank, N.A., CFPB No. 2018-BCFP-0003 (June 29, 2018), ﬁles.consumerﬁnance.gov/
f/documents/bcfp_citibank-na_consent-order_2018-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/FRH7-HDP3].
155 Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgement, FTC v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, No. 14-04785 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/ﬁles/documents/
cases/att_mobility_llc_doc_201_2019-12-04_permanent_injunction_monetary_judgment_003.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BJF4-CMDE].
156 Stipulated Final Consent Order at 2, CFPB v. Think Finance, LLC, No. 4:17-cv-00127 (D.
Mont. Feb. 5, 2020), https://ﬁles.consumerﬁnance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_think-ﬁnance_stipulatedﬁnal-consent-order_2020-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/ELN8-EAZM].
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themselves cause traceable ﬁnancial losses to individual consumers, but may
nonetheless be a target for FTC or CFPB actions.
The argument here is that different enforcement mechanisms for policing
unfair terms have different effects on how consumers understand their legal
world. When unenforceable terms are excised and smoothed over, contracts
stay long and formal, and consumer law looks like a monolith. When they
receive public approbation or private penalties, the contracts themselves change
and public perception may follow, in turn creating a more robust political and
cultural conversation around how firms create legal obligations for consumers.
C. Measuring Attitudes About Law
Although this research primarily involves a set of questions about contract
law and behavior, these studies also raise some important methodological
questions for legal and social science scholars who measure attitudes about
law. For at least a half-century, legal scholarship has embraced and
internalized the assumptions, values, and language of economic theory.157 At
the core of that embrace is the faith in self-interest, the belief that humans
can, should, and will take steps to pursue their own goals, however broadly
deﬁned.158 Psychologists have long observed that people often appear to
evince beliefs that are in direct tension with their own self-interest, or at least
their apparent self-interest.159 The explanation from psychologists essentially
challenges the shallow notion of self-interest—what is in my interest is not
just what would ultimately make me richer or happier, but also the choices
that dignify the life I am living now.160 System justiﬁcation theory, for
example, argues that there are particular contexts in which motivated
reasoning captures more than material self-interest. It captures instead a
preference to perceive control or orderliness in the universe or, conversely, to
avoid feeling chronically angry or depressed at an unfair world.
It is in this light that it might be worth revisiting the consent results here.
The main inference we can reasonably draw from these results on consent is
157 See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies,
57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 687 (1986) (discussing the elements of the economic theory of law,
including the assumption of rational behavior, risk aversion, and eﬃciency); Alan Schwartz & Louis
Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 630, 630-31 (1979) (describing the utility and limits of using economic theory to solve
legal problems).
158 See, e.g., Jack Hirschleifer, The Expanding Domain of Economics, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 53, 53
(1985) (arguing that economic theory encompasses a wide scope of preferences and values more
often associated with disciplines like moral philosophy).
159 See, e.g., Jost, supra note 91, at 73 (describing the apparent paradox of low-income voters
choosing political candidates who eschew redistributive policies).
160 See generally Jost, Gaucher & Stern, supra note 88 (outlining the theory of system justification).
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that contractual assent looks like “real” consent to most people. Consent
ratings were consistently deﬁnitive and high. Contracts here may provide a
window into a broader social and psychological phenomenon: the preference
to see oneself as a subject and not an object. Roseanna Sommers, Vanessa
Bohns, Meirav Furth-Matzkin, and others have begun to write about consent
across an array of contexts, including contracting but also medical
decisionmaking, sexual contact, and privacy intrusions. Sommers, for
example, asked a series of questions about whether or not various personal
violations were consensual when they were procured by intentional
deception. Is sex consensual when a partner claims to be unmarried but is
not? Is an elective surgery consensual when the doctor lies about its cost? The
remarkable ﬁnding of Sommers’s studies was subjects’ consistent resistance
to judgments of nonconsensuality. The only one of her many examples in
which less than half (49.4%) of all subjects found consent was deception about
HIV status resulting in HIV transmission.161
In research with Vanessa Bohns, Sommers plumbed the psychology of
consent further.162 They asked subjects to come into the lab and randomly
assigned them to one of two conditions: real request or hypothetical request.
The request in each case was for the subjects’ phone. A research assistant either
asked “can you please unlock your phone and hand it to me?” or provided
subjects with a hypothetical and asked “[w]ould you hand over your phone in
this scenario?”163 Subjects who got the hypothetical request essentially said no;
a little more than a quarter (27.6%) of the subjects reported that they would
let the researcher look at their unlocked phone. Subjects in the real request
condition handed over their phones essentially every time (97.1%).164 The
magnitude of the difference between the two conditions, in other words, was
about 70 percentage points. No one thought they would consent to a privacy
intrusion under the extraordinarily light pressure of an adolescent RA making
a polite request, yet everyone consented.
If the first of these consent findings is that subjects do not view consent as
being meaningfully vitiated when it is elicited through trickery,165 the second
finding might be that they do not view themselves as likely to give consent
lightly.166 We can think of this as two separate phenomena, as I did in a 2014
Roseanna Sommers, Commonsense Consent, 129 YALE L.J. 2232, 2255-56 (2020).
Roseanna Sommers & Vanessa K. Bohns, The Voluntariness of Voluntary Consent: Consent
Searches and the Psychology of Compliance, 128 YALE L.J. 1962, 1983-87 (2019).
163 Id. at 1983.
164 Id. at 1985.
165 Meirav Furth-Matzkin & Roseanna Sommers, Consumer Psychology and the Problem of FinePrint Fraud, 72 STAN. L. REV. 503, 503 (2020).
166 Sommers & Bohns, supra note 162 at 1993-97 (showing that people underestimate the
diﬃculty of withholding consent when they are not themselves experiencing social pressure to
consent); see also Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 98, at 1771-74 (showing results of a study suggesting
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paper: first, there is a preference to think of oneself as careful, or savvy, or
discerning (“I would not risk a bad outcome by consenting”);167 second, there
is a preference to think of the world as orderly and just (“this bad outcome is
not evidence of malfeasance; it is the result of my choice to take a risk”). In
other words, these are species of overconfidence or overoptimism.168 But
scholars might do well to think of these as part of an integrated and specific
phenomenon—a belief that consent is special.169 Indeed, we might think about
consent as a means of facilitating system justification more generally—if I
agreed to it, it is not, by definition, out of my control or morally wrong. I
cannot be a victim if the outcome was my choice.
In much of economics, rational actor models are employed to describe
consumption patterns, but it is not unusual to consider arguably
nonconsumptive choices in terms of rationality. For example: is it rational to
vote?170 Is it rational to commit a violent felony?171 Is it rational to get
married?172 These choices are all questions with real legal ramiﬁcations. When
decisionmaking implicates a broad set of moral, social, and legal norms, as
well as more immediate visceral and ﬁnancial well-being, evaluating
rationality per se is naturally more fraught. These studies measured attitudes
toward a series of legal constructs—contracts, contract rules, and parties—
much like the consent research described above. The insight from the research
here is that the attitudes that subjects reported were (a) malleable, and (b)
motivated in ways that are not obvious. Measuring attitudes about legal rules
or legal constructs is a distinctive task in at least two ways. The ﬁrst is that
legal decisionmaking always involves anticipating what an authority believes
about your choice. The second is that legal decisionmaking is situated within
the context of a society. That is, it naturally implicates social and moral
values—what we owe each other. These are fundamentally social beliefs, and
therefore fall within the natural parameters of social psychology.

that people overestimate their own likelihood to read carefully before signing a contract and
underestimate the diﬃculty of assenting with full knowledge).
167 Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 98, at 1771-74.
168 Id. at 1771 (reporting a study of the relationship between overconﬁdence in one’s own
readership and blame for nonreading consumers).
169 See, e.g., Sommers, supra note 161, at 2285-87 (describing the unique role of consent in
judgments of moral harm and moral blame).
170 See, e.g., Aaron Edlin, Andrew Gelman & N. Kaplan, Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and
How People Vote to Improve the Well-Being of Others, 19 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 293, 305 (2007)
(arguing that voting is rational when people have other-regarding preferences).
171 See generally Irving Piliavin, Rosemary Gartner, Craig Thornton & Ross L. Matsueda,
Crime, Deterrence, and Rational Choice, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 101 (1986) (specifying the economic model
for crime deterrence under a rational actor theory).
172 See generally Elizabeth Scott, Rational Decision-Making About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA.
L. REV. 9 (1990) (describing family law and family behavior in light of rational bargaining models).
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CONCLUSION
In the past decade, psychological and behavioral studies have found that
individual commitment to contracts persists beyond personal relationships
and traditional promises. Even take-it-or-leave-it consumer contracts get
substantial deference from consumers—even when the terms are
unenforceable,173 even when the assent is procedurally compromised,174 and
even when the drafter is an impersonal commercial actor.175 It is puzzling to
ﬁnd that the very population most likely to be subject to unfair provisions or
harsh contractual penalties is relentlessly sanguine about their apparent
vulnerability. In some sense, the explanation oﬀered here is the simplest:
people accept their deals and defer to their terms because it feels better than
the alternative. Legal rules and ﬁne print are inescapable parts of our
landscape. These studies suggest that some term deference is motivated by
an underlying drive to make peace with the status quo, especially when the
status quo seems ﬁrmly rooted. The results here have implications not only
for contract law, but also for how we understand self-interest in legal
decisionmaking, and for the legal understandings of consent and compliance.

Furth-Matzkin & Sommers, supra note 1667.
Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 3, at 117, 149-62.
See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan supra note 98 at 1764-65 (ﬁnding widespread agreement that
customers have meaningfully consented even to hidden terms).
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